dev.cocore.inference.dispatch

{
  "type": "procedure",
  "input": {
    "schema": {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "model",
        "prompt",
        "maxTokensOut",
        "priceCeiling"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "model": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1
        },
        "nonce": {
          "type": "string",
          "maxLength": 64,
          "minLength": 32,
          "description": "Fresh lowercase-hex freshness challenge (>=16 random bytes) supplied by the caller when `requireConfidential` is set. The provider's enclave signs (ephemeralPubKey || nonce || attestationCid) so the caller can prove the ephemeral seal key was minted for THIS request and is not replayed. Required when requireConfidential is true; ignored otherwise."
        },
        "prompt": {
          "type": "string",
          "minLength": 1
        },
        "maxTokensOut": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 1
        },
        "priceCeiling": {
          "type": "object",
          "required": [
            "amount",
            "currency"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "amount": {
              "type": "integer",
              "minimum": 0
            },
            "currency": {
              "type": "string",
              "minLength": 1
            }
          }
        },
        "targetProviderDid": {
          "type": "string",
          "format": "did",
          "description": "Pin dispatch to a specific provider DID instead of letting the advisor route."
        },
        "requireConfidential": {
          "type": "boolean",
          "description": "Demand the `attested-confidential` tier: the chosen provider must present a verified, signing-key-bound Apple MDA chain, a known-good measured cdHash, the hardened-runtime posture, and a fresh enclave-signed ephemeral session key bound to `nonce`. If no eligible provider is available the request fails closed with `ConfidentialUnavailable` rather than silently downgrading to best-effort. Optional / additive; absent or false means best-effort."
        }
      }
    },
    "encoding": "application/json"
  },
  "errors": [
    {
      "name": "AuthRequired",
      "description": "The caller is not authenticated."
    },
    {
      "name": "InvalidRequest",
      "description": "The body failed validation."
    },
    {
      "name": "ConfidentialUnavailable",
      "description": "requireConfidential was set but no provider could satisfy the attested-confidential tier (no verified+bound MDA chain, cdHash not in the known-good set, posture failed, or the ephemeral session handshake did not verify). The request was NOT downgraded; no prompt was sealed."
    }
  ],
  "output": {
    "encoding": "text/event-stream",
    "description": "A Server-Sent Events stream of `meta`, `chunk`, `complete`, and `error` frames (see the method description for payloads)."
  },
  "description": "Submit an inference request and stream the result back as Server-Sent Events. Authenticates the requester, runs the dispatch core, and emits typed SSE frames. Unlike `submit` (which returns URIs to poll), `dispatch` drives the full request and streams plaintext output chunks until completion.\n\nConfidentiality: by default the AppView seals the prompt to the chosen provider on the caller's behalf (`best-effort` tier) — convenient, but the AppView is in the plaintext path. A caller that needs privacy FROM the provider sets `requireConfidential` and supplies a fresh `nonce`; the AppView then runs the verified, enclave-bound ephemeral handshake and either confirms an `attested-confidential` session or fails closed with the `ConfidentialUnavailable` error. For genuine end-to-end confidentiality the prompt is sealed at the client edge (SDK/browser) and the AppView forwards ciphertext only; this method's server-side seal path is always `best-effort`.\n\nSSE events:\n  * `meta`       — { jobUri, jobCid, authUri, inputCommitment, providerDid, sessionId, tier }\n  * `sessionKey` — { ephemeralPubKey, nonce, attestationCid, signature }   (only when `requireConfidential`; the enclave-signed fresh key the requester verifies before sealing)\n  * `chunk`      — { seq, text }   (plaintext, decrypted)\n  * `complete`   — { tokensIn, tokensOut, receiptUri, tier, providerCredit? }\n  * `error`      — { reason, code }"
}